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Abstract 
We assess the impact of credit constraints on investment, inventories and other working 
capital and firm growth with a large panel of small and medium-sized enterprises from 12 
European countries for the period 2014-2016. The data come from the Survey on the 
access to finance of enterprises (SAFE), a survey that is especially designed to analyse 
the problems in the access to external finance of European SMEs. The key identification 
challenge is a potential reverse-causality bias, as firms with poor investment and growth 
opportunities may have a higher probability of being credit constrained. We implement 
several strategies to overcome this obstacle: proxies for investment opportunities, lagged 
regressors, random effects and instrumental variables. Our findings suggest that credit 
constraints, both in bank financing and other financing (e.g. trade credit), have strong 
negative effects on investment in fixed assets, while the impact on firm growth and working 
capital is less robust. 
Keywords: investment, firm growth, working capital, ordered probit, instrumental variables.  
JEL Classification: G30, G31, G32. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
En este estudio analizamos el impacto de las restricciones al crédito en la inversión, los 
inventarios y el crecimiento empresarial con una muestra grande de pequeñas y medianas 
empresas de 12 economías europeas durante el período 2014-2016. Los datos provienen de la 
Encuesta sobre el Acceso a la Financiación de las Empresas (SAFE), una encuesta 
especialmente diseñada para analizar los problemas en el acceso a la financiación de las pymes 
europeas. El principal obstáculo en la identificación es una posible causalidad bidireccional, 
puesto que las empresas con pocas oportunidades de inversión y crecimiento pueden tener una 
mayor probabilidad de estar restringidas en el crédito. Implementamos diversas estrategias para 
solventar este problema: medidas de oportunidades de inversión, regresores retardados, efectos 
aleatorios y variables instrumentales. Nuestros resultados sugieren que las restricciones al 
crédito, tanto en el crédito bancario como en otra financiación (p. ej., crédito comercial), tienen 
un fuerte impacto negativo en la inversión en activos fijos, mientras que el impacto en el 
crecimiento empresarial y en los inventarios es menos robusto.  
Palabras clave: inversión, crecimiento empresarial, activo circulante, probit ordinal, variables 
instrumentales. 
Códigos JEL: G30, G31, G32. 
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1 Introduction 
According to the Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958), under certain conditions, a firm’s capital 
structure is irrelevant to its value. This implies that, in perfect capital markets, a firm’s financing 
decisions are independent from its investment decisions. In this case, internal and external 
funds are perfect substitutes, and real firm decisions, motivated by the maximisation of 
shareholders’ claims, are independent of financial factors such as internal liquidity, debt 
leverage or dividend payments. In practice, however, factors such as transaction costs, tax 
advantages, costs of financial distress, agency costs and asymmetric information lead to an 
imperfect substitutability between internal and external funds1, leading to the external finance 
premium.2 In this context, financial constraints may have an important (negative) effect on real 
variables such as investment, working capital and firm growth, especially for firms with 
insufficient internal funds (cashflows and retained earnings).  
The purpose of this research is to test this theoretical prediction. We do so with a 
panel of about 5,000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from 12 European countries 
for the period 2014-2016. The firm-level data come from the Survey on the access to finance 
of enterprises (SAFE), a survey that is run jointly by the European Central Bank and the 
European Commission every six months since 2009.3 The survey, initiated in the middle of the 
Great Recession, was especially designed to analyse the problems in the access to external 
finance faced by European SMEs, so it constitutes an ideal source of information about the 
credit constraints experienced by those firms.  
In line with previous studies on the SAFE4, we develop several survey-based indicators 
of credit constraints, distinguishing between constraints in the access to bank finance (bank 
loans, bank overdrafts, credit lines) and in the access to other finance (trade credit, leasing, 
factoring, debt and equity securities, etc). While bank finance is the predominant source of 
external funds for SMEs in Europe, Casey and O’Toole (2014) find that bank-constrained SMEs 
substitute trade credit, informal lending and loans from other companies for bank credit.5 Hence, 
it is crucial to control for all sources of external finance when assessing firms’ financial constraints 
to avoid an omitted variable bias. Following the existing literature6, our measures of credit 
constraints are dummy variables that equal one if any of the following circumstances took place: 
a) a firm’s application to external financing got rejected; b) a firm only received a limited part of 
what it applied for (i.e., quantity rationing); c) a firm refused the lender’s proposal for external 
financing because the borrowing costs were too high (i.e., price rationing); d) a firm did not apply 
for external financing because it feared its application would be rejected (i.e., discouraged 
borrowers). Nevertheless, we check the robustness of our results by using an alternative measure 
of financial constraints based on firms’ perceptions about access to finance.  
Our goal is to identify the causal effect of credit constraints on investment, inventories 
and other working capital and firm growth. The key identification challenge we face is a 
                                                                          
1 See Fazzari et al. (1988) and Schiantarelli (1996) for a review of the theoretical research in this area.  
2 See, for instance, Bernanke and Gertler (1995).  
3 We limit our sample to the rounds 11 to 15 of SAFE (from April-September 2014 to April-September 2016) because of 
the availability of some key variables.  
4 See, inter alia, Casey and O’Toole (2014), Ferrando and Mulier (2015b), Ferrando et al. (2017), Ferrando and Mulier 
(2015b), Ferrando and Griesshaber (2011), Artola and Genre (2011).  
5 By contrast, they do not find that bank-constrained SMEs apply for, or use, market finance (issued debt or equity).  
6 See, for instance, Ferrando et al. (2017), Ferrando and Mulier (2015a) and Artola and Genre (2011).  
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potential reverse-causality bias, as we expect firms with poor investment/growth opportunities 
to have a higher probability of being credit constrained. We implement several strategies to 
overcome this obstacle. First, we proxy investment opportunities with a measure of enterprise-
specific outlook7, as in Ferrando and Mulier (2015b). We also control for traditional 
determinants of investment opportunities such as firm size and age (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) 
and include changes in firm’s turnover as in empirical investment models based on the 
“acceleration principle” (Abel and Blanchard, 1986).8 Second, in all our regressions we include 
country-industry-time fixed effects to control for time-varying country-specific and industry-
specific investment and growth opportunities. Third, to avoid the potential contemporaneous 
endogeneity between investment dynamics, firm growth and credit constraints, we exploit the 
panel nature of our data and include lagged values of the credit constraint dummies, as well as 
lagged values of the time-varying controls. 
In robustness, we also carry out two other strategies. First, we control for firm-level 
unobserved heterogeneity with a random-effects ordered probit model, which may capture the 
time-invariant component of investment/growth opportunities and help us mitigate the omitted 
variable bias.  
Second, as we cannot perfectly control for firms’ investment and growth 
opportunities, we use an instrumental variable to isolate the exogenous part of credit 
constraints. The proposed instrument is adjusted credit standards, a variable that measures 
the supply-only component of bank credit standards of each country in each round of the 
SAFE. The variable comes from the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey (BLS), a survey that asks euro 
area banks about developments in their respective credit markets. According to the BLS, credit 
standards are the internal guidelines or loan approval criteria of a bank. However, credit 
standards may not be a valid IV because they may be correlated with aggregate demand 
effects: for instance, countries likely have tighter credit standards when banks have lower 
expectations about employment growth, investment, etc. To derive a correct instrumental 
variable we use another question of the BLS that asks banks about the supply and demand 
factors that determine the evolution of their credit standards. Hence, in a second step we 
regress credit standards on their demand factors.  The residuals of those regressions are 
adjusted credit standards, i.e., the supply-only component of credit standards.  
Our main findings suggest that credit constraints, both in bank financing and other 
financing, have important effects in investment in fixed assets, inventories and other working 
capital and firm growth. According to our baseline estimates (with a pooled ordered probit 
model), a firm that is constrained in bank financing has 2.1 percentage point higher probability 
of decreasing investment and a 2.8 pp lower probability of increasing it.9 Likewise, a firm that is 
constrained in other financing has 3.4 pp higher probability of decreasing investment and a 4.5 
pp lower probability of increasing it. Notice that these effects are additive, implying that a firm 
that is constrained in all sorts of financing face a 5.5 pp greater likelihood of cutting down 
investment and a 7.3 pp lower likelihood of raising it. The effects on firm growth (measured in 
terms of employment) are of similar magnitude, but only credit constraints in bank financing 
have a significant effect. In particular, being bank-constrained raises 2.9 pp the probability of 
decreasing employment and reduces 4.1 pp the probability of increasing it. Regarding 
                                                                          
7 In particular, the firm is asked to assess the evolution of its own outlook, with respect to its sales and profitability or 
business plan, i.e., whether it has improved, remained unchanged or deteriorated over the past six months. 
8 Those models link the demand for capital goods to changes in firms’ output or sales. 
9 One of the advantages of ordered probit models, relative to binary choice models such as probit or logit, is that we can 
allow for asymmetric effects, i.e., the effect on the probability of increasing investment and the effect on the probability 
of decreasing it do not necessarily have the same size.  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1808 
inventories and other working capital, it is interesting to notice that only credit constraints in 
other financing have a significant impact, probably capturing the crucial role of trade credit in 
customer-supplier relationships. Specifically, a firm that is constrained in other financing has 
4.9 pp higher probability of decreasing working capital and a 5.7 pp lower probability of 
increasing it. Things change little when we add random effects to the model, and the results 
with an alternative measure of credit constraints confirm their importance. The IV estimations 
suggest that overall credit constraints have strong negative effects on investment in fixed 
assets, while the impact on firm growth and working capital is less robust. 
In addition, we analyse heterogeneous effects by computing average marginal effects 
for different types of firms (size, age, ownership structure). A remarkable result is that micro firms 
(less than 10 employees) are largely unaffected by credit constraints, probably because those 
firms rely more on internal funds (cashflows and retained earnings) to fund their investment 
projects, making them less sensitive to access to external funds. This result complements those 
of Beck et al. (2005), who find that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) face greater 
financial, legal and corruption obstacles compared to large firms and the constraining impact of 
obstacles on firm growth is inversely related to firm size. However, Beck et al. (2005) compare 
SMEs with large firms, while we compare micro, small and medium-sized firms.10 Hence, the 
effect of credit constraints on firm investment and growth may be a non-monotonic (concave) 
function of firm size.  Moreover, the negative effect of credit constraints on firm growth seems to 
be mainly driven by the impact on family businesses and on sole traders, while most of the other 
ownership categories (e.g. listed companies, firms owned by other enterprises) are largely 
unaffected, which is consistent with asymmetric information problems. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and 
explains this paper’s contribution. Section 3 describes the sample and the construction of the 
variables used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 explains the econometric techniques and 
the identification strategy. Section 5 describes the baseline results. Section 6 displays several 
robustness tests. Finally, section 7 concludes. Some descriptive statistics, technical details and 
additional results are displayed in several appendices.  
 
                                                                          
10 Beck et al. (2005) compare small (5-50 employees), medium-sized (51-500) and large firms (more than 500 
employees), while we compare micro (1-9 employees), small (10-49 employees) and medium-sized firms (50-249 
employees) and we do not have large firms in our sample. 
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2 Related literature and contribution 
Most previous research on financial constraints is based on financial statement data. In this 
literature, the standard approach is to use indirect measures of financial constraints such as 
dividend pay-out behaviour, association with business groups, size, age, ownership form and 
credit ratings to test whether the sensitivity of investment to cashflows is greater in the group of 
firms that are more likely to be constrained.11 For instance, the seminal work of Fazzari et al. 
(1988) classified US firms according to their dividend pay-out ratio. The intuition is that, if the 
cost disadvantage of external finance is small, retention practices should reveal little or nothing 
about investment, as firms will simply use external funds to smooth investment when internal 
finance fluctuates. By contrast, if the cost disadvantage is significant (i.e., large external finance 
premium) firms that retain and invest most of their income (i.e., those with a low pay-out ratio) 
may have no low-cost source of investment finance, and their investment should be driven by 
fluctuations in cash flows. Consistent with this hypothesis, the authors find that the investment 
of firms that exhaust all their internal finance is more sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow than 
that of high-dividend firms. Nevertheless, a standard criticism of the studies on investment-
cash flow sensitivities is that liquidity proxies for other unobservable determinants of investment 
such as the profitability of investment. High liquidity signals that the firm has done well and is 
likely to continue doing well. Thus, more liquid firms have better investment opportunities, and it 
is not surprising that they tend to invest more. Although one can use the Tobin’s q to control 
for investment opportunities, Tobin’s q is difficult to measure in practice and may well differ 
from the marginal q firms use to make their investment decisions. In addition, this strand of the 
literature has been challenged by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), who provide theoretical reasons 
and empirical evidence that a greater sensitivity of investment to cash flow is not a reliable 
measure of financing constraints.12  
Given the limitations of those studies, there is a new emerging strand of the literature 
that attempts to assess the impact of financial constraints on real variables using survey data. 
The key idea is to obtain direct measures of financial constraints by asking firms about potential 
problems in their access to credit markets. Campello et al. (2010) do so with two samples, a 
cross-section of 1,050 very large corporations13 from US, Europe and Asia in the fourth quarter 
of 2008 and a smaller rotating panel of US companies in the 2007Q3-2008Q4 period. Using 
the first dataset, they find that constrained firms planned, on average, deeper cuts in 
technology expenditures, capital expenditures, marketing expenditures, employment, cash 
holdings and dividend payments than unconstrained firms. In addition, recognising that 
comparisons of means may be confounded by systematic differences between constrained 
and unconstrained firms in other dimensions, they undertake matching techniques on several 
observable characteristics with their sample of US companies, finding significant differences 
between the two groups. Nevertheless, a limitation of their identification strategy is the potential 
endogeneity of financial constraints. If a firm’s poor performance (e.g. lower spending in 
                                                                          
11 See Schiantarelli (1996) for a review of this vast literature.  
12 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) undertake an in-depth analysis of the 49 low dividend firms that Fazzari et al. (1988) identify 
as financially constrained by examining managers’ views on their firms’ access to credit (gleaned from managers’ 
statements filed in corporate 10-Ks), complemented with some quantitative data and public news. On this basis, they 
rank the extent to which the firms are financially constrained. Strikingly, they find that those firms classified as less 
financially constrained exhibit a significantly greater investment-cash flow sensitivity than those firms classified as more 
financially constrained. 
13 For instance, they categorise as “small” those firms with total gross sales amounting to less than $1 billion or with less 
than 500 employees. By contrast, according to the European Commission, small and medium sized firms are those 
with turnover less than $50 million and less than 250 employees.  
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technology or capital) increases the likelihood of being credit constrained, then the matching 
estimators will fail to deliver the causal impact of financial constraints on investment and 
growth.14  
Another study, very much in the spirit of this paper, is Ferrando and Mulier (2015b), in 
which they analyse the effect of being a discouraged borrower (i.e., firms that do not apply for a 
bank loan because they fear that their application will be rejected) on firm investment and 
growth. To do so they use a unique database that matches firms’ answers to the SAFE with 
their financial statements for 9 euro area countries from the second quarter of 2010 until the 
first quarter of 2014. To take into account the endogeneity between discouragement and 
investment/growth, they use two-stage least squares and instrument their dummy for 
discouraged borrowers with a firm-level financial constraints indicator, namely a dummy that 
equals 1 if the firm considers access to finance as the most pressing problem. However, such 
an instrument is likely to be invalid if lenders observe a firm’s lack of investment/growth 
opportunities and in turn decide to restrain credit, making access to credit the firm’s most 
pressing problem. To put it differently, their endogenous regressor is a financial constraints 
indicator, “discouraged borrowers”, and their instrumental variable is another financial 
constraints indicator, “access to finance as most pressing problem”, which is likely to be 
endogenous as well. Nevertheless, their estimates suggest that there is a negative and strong 
correlation between credit constraints, firm investment and growth.  
In addition, Beck et al. (2005) use data on 4,000 firms from 54 countries from a cross-
sectional survey conducted by the World Bank in 1999-2000, the World Business Environment 
Survey (WEBS), to analyse the effect of financial, legal and corruption obstacles on firm growth. 
For instance, in the case of financial obstacles, the survey includes questions that require, as 
an answer, a rating from 1 (no obstacle) to 4 (major obstacle) on factors such as collateral 
requirements, bank paperwork and bureaucracy, high interest rates and access to long-term 
loans. These are perceived financial obstacles, rather than actual financing constraints, as the 
formulation of the questions does not allow knowing if firms were denied credit. The authors 
find a negative correlation between those obstacles and firm growth. They also find that the 
negative impact of the obstacles on firm growth is a decreasing function of firm size (i.e., the 
smallest firms are consistently the most adversely affected by all obstacles) and it is inversely 
related to institutional development (i.e., financial and institutional development weakens the 
constraining effects of financial, legal and corruption obstacles.) Nevertheless, the lack of firm-
level measures of investment opportunities and the potential endogeneity of the firm-level 
obstacles (firms that are not growing because of internal problems systematically shift blame to 
the legal and financial institutions and report high obstacles) cast some doubts on the causal 
interpretation of their estimates.15  In a similar fashion, Coluzzi et al. (2015) study the impact of 
financial obstacles on firm growth in five euro area countries16 using the WEBS and the 
Amadeus database. Identification of the causal impact of financial obstacles on firm growth 
relies on the estimation via the GMM-system estimator, in which all the regressors are 
instrumented with their lagged values. While the estimations deliver a negative coefficient on 
the financial obstacles variable in four out of the five countries, the Sargan-Hansen test rejects 
                                                                          
14 This is acknowledged by the authors: “Yet another concern is whether uncontrolled firm heterogeneity could confound 
our inferences. Consider, for example, a company that performs poorly even before the crisis. It would not be surprising 
to find that this firm might both do worse during the crisis (e.g., invest less) and find less available credit” (page 471).  
15 Aware of the potential revere-causality bias, the authors carry out some sensitivity analyses in which the financial, legal 
and corruption obstacles are instrumented by measures of institutional development, namely, the development of the 
financial system, the legal system and the country’s level of corruption. It is not clear, however, that the proposed 
instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction, as in previous regressions of firm growth on obstacles and institutions they 
are used as explanatory variables.  
16 France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain.  
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the null hypothesis of validity of overidentifiying restrictions in most cases, casting some doubts 
on the results.  
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on the real effects of credit constraints 
in several ways.17 First, it extends the work of Ferrando and Mulier (2015b) on discouraged 
borrowers to both “formal” and “informal” credit constraints (discouragement, quantity 
rationing, price rationing, rejected applications) and assesses the role of all sources of 
financing, not only bank loans, in shaping business decisions. It also covers a larger number of 
countries and analyses the recovery period of the European economy (2014-2016), unlike 
previous studies that have focused on the last recession. This is particularly interesting as the 
Eurozone prepares itself for monetary policy normalisation, which could influence on firms’ 
investment via the so-called balance sheet channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) and the 
external finance premium paid by credit constrained firms.18 It also looks at the impact of 
financial constraints on inventories and other working capital, an aspect that has traditionally 
been overlooked in the literature, with few exceptions (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). Finally, it 
attempts to establish a causal link between credit constraints and firm investment, inventories 
and growth by exploiting the panel nature of the data and by making use of an instrumental 
variable to isolate the exogenous part of credit constraints. 
 
                                                                          
17 In addition, there are several papers that use quasi-experimental techniques to estimate the real effects of credit supply 
shocks. See, inter alia, Jiménez et al. (2017), Alfaro et al. (2016), Greenstone et al. (2014), Chodorow-Reich (2014), 
Acharya et.al (2016), Balduzzi et al. (2016). See also Buca and Vermeulen (2017) for the effect of bank credit tightening 
on firm investment.  
18 The balance sheet channel theorises that the size of the external finance premium is inversely related to the borrower's 
net worth (liquid assets plus the collateral value of illiquid assets). Hence, an increase in the interest rate will work not 
only through the traditional impact on the user cost of capital, but also through the adverse impact on the present 
value of collateralizable net worth, leading to a widening of the wedge between the cost of external and internal finance 
and, therefore, to a reduction in investment and production.   
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1808 
3 Data description and construction of variables  
The data source for our analysis is the firm-level Survey on the Access to Finance of 
Enterprises (SAFE), which is run jointly by the ECB and the European Commission since 2009. 
The sample contains only non-financial firms and excludes firms in agriculture, public 
administration and financial services. Some of the firms are interviewed only once in the survey 
but there is a rotating panel of enterprises that are re-surveyed in subsequent rounds, which is 
the dataset we use for our analyses. We do not use answers by large firms19 because the 
anonymised micro dataset does not provide information on the sector of activity of those 
companies to protect the confidentiality of the answers, and the industry of activity is an 
important control variable in our regression analysis. We also limit our sample to the rounds 11 
to 15 of SAFE (from April-September 2014 to April-September 2016) because of the availability 
of some key variables.20 After applying these filters, we end up with a sample of 7,162 non-
missing observations21 corresponding to 4,880 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
from 12 European countries.22 
Most of the information of the SAFE is qualitative, implying that most of the variables in 
the sample are categorical. Table 1 lists the names of the variables and the values they can 
take. A first set of variables contains information on the general characteristics of the firms such 
as country, industry, size (measured by the number of employees23 or by turnover volume), age 
(in intervals of years), legal form (whether the firm is an autonomous enterprise or a 
subsidiary/branch of another enterprise), ownership structure (whether the firm is owned by a 
single natural person, by a family, by public shareholders, etc) and export activity.24   
A second set of variables comprises several measures of credit constraints in bank 
financing (bank loans and credit lines) and in trade credit and other financing (equity and debt 
securities, leasing, factoring, intercompany loans, etc). Our preferred measures are the so-
called wide indicators of credit constraints, which combine formal and informal credit 
constraints, a strategy that is standard in the literature since the seminal work of Jappelli 
(1990). Following the existing literature25, those variables equal one if, for each type of 
financing, any of the following circumstances took place: a) a firm’s application to external 
financing got rejected; b) a firm only received a limited part (i.e., less than 75%) of what it 
applied for (i.e., quantity rationing); c) a firm refused the lender’s proposal for external financing 
because the borrowing costs were too high (i.e., price rationing); d) a firm did not apply for 
external financing because it feared its application would be rejected (i.e., discouraged 
borrowers).26 As in Ferrando et al. (2017) and Casey and O’Toole (2014), we build a single 
credit constraints indicator for bank loans and credit lines (cc_bank), assuming that a firm is 
                                                                          
19 Defined as those companies with 250 employees or more.  
20 The SAFE questionnaire has been amended in several occasions, which provokes breaks in some series. In addition, 
some of the questions, which belong to a more comprehensive questionnaire, are only asked every one or two years in 
the rounds that are run in cooperation with the European Commission.  
21 The actual number of observations used in the estimations varies according to the dependent variable and the selected 
measure of credit constraints. Here we present descriptive statistics for the sample used for the baseline regressions 
of investment growth, as presented in Table 6 
22 Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia.  
23 Micro firms: 1-9 employees; small firms: 10-49 employees; medium firms: 50-249 employees.  
24 A firm is an exporter if any percentage of the company’s turnover is accounted for by exports of goods and services.  
25 See, for instance, Ferrando et al. (2017), Ferrando and Mulier (2015a) and Artola and Genre (2011).  
26 The indicator is based on questions Q7A and Q7B of SAFE.  Those questions are asked only to those firms that 
consider each source of financing (e.g. bank loans) relevant, as determined in question Q4. This is the main reason 
why there is a non-negligible number of missing values in the variable.  
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constrained in bank financing if it is constrained in at least one of the two.27 Hence, we are 
implicitly assuming that bank loans and credit lines are imperfect substitutes. This seems a 
plausible assumption, as loans are more likely to be used to fund large investments in fixed 
assets and credit lines are more commonly used to finance working capital. In analogous 
fashion, we build a single credit constraints indicator for trade credit and other financing 
(cc_other), assuming that a firm is constrained in non-bank financing if it is constrained in at 
least one of the two. In some of our analyses we merge cc_bank and cc_other into a single 
variable, cc_all, which equals 1 if the firm is constrained in at least one of the two financing 
sources (i.e., cc_bank=1 and/or cc_other=1) and 0 if the firm is constrained in none of them 
(i.e., cc_bank=cc_other=0).  
In addition, we carry out robustness analyses with an alternative measure of credit 
constraints, problem_access_finance, which is a variable that indicates how important the 
problem “access to finance” is to the firm. In particular, the firm is asked to assess the 
importance of a series of problems (finding customers, competition, access to finance, costs of 
production or labour, availability of skilled staff, regulation, other) using a scale of 1-10, where 1 
means it is not at all important and 10 means it is extremely important. Hence, this variable 
captures “perceived financing constraints”, while the wide indicator of credit constraints 
measures “actual financing constraints”, as distinguished by Ferrando and Mulier (2015a).  
A third set of variables indicates changes in the economic and financial situation of the 
firm. In particular, firms must answer whether a set of indicators, such as investment, working 
capital, employment, interest expenses or debt to assets have decreased, remained 
unchanged or increased over the last six months before the survey.28 Finally, a fourth set of 
variables indicates whether some factors, such as the enterprise-specific outlook, the firm’s 
own capital and the firm’s credit history, have improved, remained unchanged or deteriorated.  
Table A1 of Appendix A shows the breakdown of observations by country. It can be 
seen that the survey contains more observations for the larger economies in order to be 
sufficiently representative for these countries. France, Germany, Italy and Spain each account 
of about 10-15% of the firms in the sample. Around 50% of observations belong to the 
“vulnerable countries”29, i.e., the euro area countries at the epicentre of the sovereign debt 
crisis (2009-2012). Table A2 of Appendix A shows the breakdown of observations by the main 
firm characteristics. Around one third of the observations belong to the industry sector30, 
around ten percent to the construction sector, one fourth to wholesale or retail trade and 30% 
to the rest of services. Micro, small and medium firms each account for around one third of the 
sample. Most firms are more than 10 years old (85%), autonomous enterprises (89%) and 
owned by a family (55%) or sole traders (30%). Nearly half of them are exporters.  
Table 2 shows weighted descriptive statistics, constructed with sampling weights31, 
for the dependent variables of the analysis, the measures of credit constraints and the rest of 
controls. Concerning the dependent variables, a significant proportion of the firms report no 
                                                                          
27 We follow this strategy to maximise sample size. For instance, if a firm is constrained (unconstrained) in bank loans and 
has missing information on credit lines, we assume the firm is constrained (unconstrained) in bank financing.  
28 The question of SAFE is Q2.“Have the following company indicators decreased, remained unchanged or increased 
over the past six months?” Answers on some indicators, such as investment, working capital and number of 
employees are only available since round 11 of SAFE, when the question was extended.  
29 Vulnerable countries are Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Slovenia and Cyprus. 
30 Industry includes manufacturing, mining and electricity, gas and water supply.  
31 As the sample is stratified by country, enterprise size class and economic activity, we use sampling weights in all our 
statistical analyses. The weights restore the proportions of the economic weight (in terms of number of employees) of 
each size class, economic activity and country.  
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changes in investment, working capital and employment, and the percentage of firms that 
report an increase in those variables is higher than the percentage that report a decrease. With 
respect to the indicators of credit constraints, sixteen per cent of firms are constrained in bank 
finance (cc_bank=1), ten per cent are constrained in trade credit or other financing (cc_other=1) 
and nineteen per cent are constrained in some source of financing (cc_all=1).  The average 
value of problem_access_finance is 5.7 and its standard deviation is 2.9, which means that the 
average firm considers access to finance to be a relatively important problem.  
Table 3 shows pairwise correlations among the different measures of credit constraints. 
As the correlations among the wide indicators (cc_bank, cc_other, cc_all) and the measure of 
perceived financial constraints (problem_access_finance) are moderate, the analysis can benefit 
from using different measures of credit constraints. In addition, the relatively high correlation 
between cc_bank and cc_other (about 0.5) highlights the importance of controlling for credit 
constraints in trade credit and other financing when assessing the impact of credit constraints in 
bank finance on investment, working capital and firm growth. In similar fashion, Table 4 shows 
the value of the Cramer’s V, which is a measure of association between two categorical 
variables that ranges between 0 and 1, for each pair of dependent variables. All values are 
between 0.2 and 0.3, indicating a moderate association among the variables.  
To inspect a possible link between financial constraints and the dependent variables of 
our analysis (investment, working capital and employment), Figure 1 shows the distribution of 
those variables conditional on the values of cc_bank, as well as the statistic and p-value of the 
Pearson's chi-squared test of independence and the value of the Cramer’s V. The picture that 
emerges is quite similar in the three variables. In each case, we can observe that the 
percentage of firms that report a decrease in the variable is substantially larger (at least 10 
percentage points) in the group of financially constrained firms (cc_bank=1), while the 
percentage of firms that report an increase in the variable is substantially larger (at least 5 
percentage points) in the group of firms without credit constraints (cc_bank=0). The percentage 
of firms whose investment remained unchanged is also slightly lower in the group of 
constrained firms. These differences are also statistically significant, as we reject the null 
hypothesis of independence in the Pearson's chi-squared test for a 1% significance level. The 
values of the Cramer’s V, between 0.1 and 0.2, also suggest meaningful relationships. Same 
qualitative results are found for credit constraints in other financing (Figure 2) although the 
values of the Cramer’s V are slightly lower, suggesting somewhat weaker relationships.  
Finally, constrained and unconstrained firms may differ in their main characteristics. 
This is inspected in Table 5 for the case of credit constraints in bank financing. Consistent with 
the literature that finds a negative relationship between the probability of experiencing financial 
constraints and size32, an 18% of micro firms are constrained, while this figure goes down to 
14% and 9% in the case of small and medium firms, respectively. The same is true when firms 
are categorised in terms of their turnover. Likewise, there is a monotonic decreasing relation 
between the proportion of credit constraints and firm age, with mature firms (10 or more years) 
being 5 pp less likely to experience constraints than new ones (less than 2 years), in line with 
previous studies.33 Also consistent with the literature that suggests that belonging to a business 
group relaxes financial constraints34, the proportion of constrained firms that are subsidiary or 
                                                                          
32 See, inter alia, Beck et al. (2005), Beck et al. (2006), Artola and Genre (2011) and Schiantarelli (1996) for a review of 
many other studies.  
33 Beck et al. (2005), Beck et al. (2006), Artola and Genre (2011), Ferrando and  Griesshaber (2011), Ferrando and Mulier (2015b). 
34 Hoshi et al. (1991), Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1995), Cho (1995), Elston and Albach (1995), Schaller (1993) and 
Chirinko and Schaller (1995).  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1808 
branches is significantly lower (10%) than that of autonomous enterprises (15%). Ownership 
structure also matters, as sole traders and family businesses are more likely (15% in both 
cases) to being constrained than publicly-listed firms (9%). There is also a significant proportion 
of constrained firms among those owned by venture capital enterprises (16%), as venture 
capital tends to fund new and risky projects for which bank finance is often not available. 
Exporting firms are less likely to be financially constrained than non-exporting (although the 
difference is quite small) because the former tend to be more competitive and productive 
(Correa-López and Doménech, 2012). Finally, the proportion of credit constrained firms is 
higher in vulnerable (19%) than in less vulnerable countries (12%). All these differences highlight 
the importance of controlling for those factors when attempting to establish a causal link 
between financial constraints and firms’ real outcomes.  
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4 Empirical methods and identification strategy 
To identify the causal impact of credit constraints on investment and working capital an 
ordered probit model has been used. For brevity of exposition, let us focus on the dependent 
variable investment growth, ∆ܫ. The order probit model is specified in terms of a continuous 
latent variable, latent investment growth ∆ܫ∗: 
                  ∆ܫ௜௝௖௧∗ = ௜ܺᇱߚ + ߙ௝௖௧ +	ߝ௜௝௖௧	                                (1)                                               
where i is firm, j is industry, c is country, t is wave, ௜ܺᇱ is a vector of variables that includes a set 
of credit constraints and firm-level controls, ߙ௝௖௧	are country-industry-time fixed effects and ߝ௜௝௖௧ 
is a disturbance that follows a N(0,1). The sign of the regression parameters ߚ can be 
immediately interpreted as determining whether the latent variable ܫ௜௝௖௧∗  increases with the 
regressor or not.  
Observed investment growth ∆ܫ, as reported to the SAFE, is then related to latent 
investment growth ∆ܫ∗ in the following way:  
  ∆ܫ௜௝௖௧ = "݀݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁"(݇ = 0)  if   ∆ܫ௜௝௖௧∗ 	≤ ߤଵ 
  ∆ܫ௜௝௖௧ 	= "remain unchanged"	(݇ = 1)  if   ߤଵ < ∆ܫ௜௝௖௧∗ 	≤ ߤଶ 
  ∆ܫ௜௝௖௧ 	= "݅݊ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁"	(k=2)  if     ∆ܫ௜௝௖௧∗ 	> ߤଷ 
where the parameters ߤଵ, ߤଶ, ߤଷ are thresholds to be jointly estimated with the slope 
parameters. See Appendix B for details about the estimation. 
Our goal is to identify the causal effect of credit constraints on firm investment, 
working capital and firm growth. The key identification challenge we face is a potential reverse-
causality bias, as we expect firms with poor investment/growth opportunities to have a higher 
probability of being credit constrained. To tackle this problem our identification strategy relies in 
the use of a comprehensive set of fixed effects, together with many firm-level covariates, to 
control for firms’ investment opportunities.  
Hence, in all our regressions we include country-industry-time fixed effects (i.e., a 
dummy for each country-industry-wave combination) to eliminate variation in the dependent 
variable that is specific to a particular country in a particular industry during a particular period 
of time (e.g., construction in Spain during the housing bust). This large set of dummies controls 
for time-varying country-specific and industry-specific investment and growth opportunities.  
Our favourite measure of investment opportunities is enterprise outlook, an indicator 
for changes in the enterprise-specific outlook, also used by Ferrando and Mulier (2015a). In 
particular, the firm is asked to assess the evolution of its own outlook, with respect to its sales 
and profitability or business plan, i.e., whether it has improved, remained unchanged or 
deteriorated over the past six months. We also include an indicator for changes in firm’s 
turnover (i.e., whether it has increased, remained unchanged or decreased over the past six 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 18 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1808 
months) as a proxy for growth opportunities, as in Gomes (2001).35 Regarding the rest of firm-
level controls, size and age, together with the firm’s industry, are traditional determinants of 
investment opportunities (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). In addition, they are correlated with credit 
constraints, as discussed in the previous section. We also control for the degree of autonomy 
of the firm (whether the firm is an autonomous enterprise or a subsidiary/branch of another 
enterprise), and include ownership structure (whether the firm is owned by a single natural 
person, by a family, by public shareholders, etc) in our regressions, as those factors are likely to 
influence investment decisions, and we include a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is an exporter. 
In addition, there is a vast literature that studies the impact of firms’ financial position on 
investment and employment decisions.36 To control for it, we follow Casey and O’Toole (2014) 
and include indicators for changes in firms’ profits, capital positions, debt to asset ratios, 
interest expenses and credit histories. We also include indicators for changes in labour costs 
and other costs as measures of trading quality and production risk.  
An identification challenge is the potential contemporaneous endogeneity between 
investment dynamics, firm growth and credit constraints. For example, within the six month 
windows that we observe in our data, a firm may experience a negative shock in its 
investment/growth opportunities (for instance, the entry into the market of a new competitor or 
some adverse regulatory change) and lenders, observing such a shock, may decide to cut their 
supply of credit to the firm. In this case, the shock in investment opportunities would be driving 
the probability of being credit constrained and therefore the relationship would be endogenous. 
To identify the causal relationship correctly and rule out any such endogeneity, we exploit the 
panel nature of our data and include lagged values of the credit constraint dummies, as well as 
lagged values of the time-varying controls. In robustness, we also control for firm-level 
unobserved heterogeneity with a random-effects ordered probit model. This technique may 
capture the time-invariant component of investment/growth opportunities (i.e., firms with 
high/low investment opportunities) and help us mitigate the omitted variable bias. 
Nevertheless, a potential caveat to the previous approach is that we cannot perfectly 
control for firms’ investment and growth opportunities, implying that the error term may be 
correlated with the credit constraint indicator. Hence, in a second approach, we use an 
instrumental variable to isolate the exogenous part of the key regressors. The proposed 
instruments, adjusted credit standards, are ordinal variables that measure the supply-only 
component of credit standards of each country in each round of the SAFE. The variables come 
from the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey (BLS), a quarterly survey that asks euro area banks about 
developments in their respective credit markets since 2003. According to the BLS, “credit 
standards are the internal guidelines or loan approval criteria of a bank…Credit standards 
specify the required borrower characteristics (e.g. balance sheet conditions, income situation, 
age, employment status) under which a loan can be obtained...”   
In particular, the BLS asks banks to describe the current level of their credit standards 
relative to the range of the bank’s credit standards between the second quarter of 2010 and 
the moment the question is formulated, and the participant bank must select an answer out of 
eight possible options, ranging from very loose to very tight. The same question is asked for 
five different loan categories (overall loans to enterprises, loans to SMEs, loans to large firms, 
loans to households for house purchase, loans for consumer credit and other lending). To 
construct the variable, we first compute the level of credit standards of each bank by assigning 
                                                                          
35 The growth rate of sales is also used in empirical investment models based on the “acceleration principle”, which links 
the demand for capital goods to the change in a firm’s output or sales (see, inter alia, Abel and Blanchard, 1986).  
36 See Herranz and Martínez-Carrascal (2017) for a review and an application to the Spanish economy. 
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values from 1 to 7 to each possible option, with higher values indicating tighter credit 
standards. We do so for the segment of loans to SMEs and for the segment of loans to large 
firms. We then calculate the average of credit standards for each country in each wave of the 
SAFE for each of segment.   
However, the resulting instrumental variables, credit standards, may not satisfy the 
independence assumption because they may be correlated with aggregate demand effects. 
For instance, countries likely have tighter credit standards when banks have lower expectations 
about employment growth, investment, etc. To derive correct instrumental variables we use 
another question of the BLS that asks banks about the factors that determine the evolution of 
credit standards. In particular, each quarter banks are required to answer whether several 
factors have contributed to tightening of credit standards, to keeping credit standards basically 
unchanged or easing of credit standards over the past three months. Those factors are:  
A) Cost of funds and balance sheet constraints. 
    -Costs related to the bank’s capital position.  
    -Bank’s ability to access market financing.  
    -Bank’s liquidity position. 
B) Pressure from competition. 
    -Competition from other banks.  
    -Competition from non-banks 
    -Competition from market financing.  
C) Perception of risk. 
    -General economic situation and outlook. 
    -Industry or firm-specific situation and outlook / borrower’s creditworthiness.  
    -Risk related to the collateral demanded.  
D) Bank’s risk tolerance.  
While A), B) and D) are supply factors, it is clear that C) comprises demand factors. 
Hence, in a second step we regress the variables credit standards on the factors “general 
economic situation”, “industry or firm-specific situation” and “risk related to the collateral 
demanded”. The residuals of those regressions are the variables adjusted credit standards, i.e., 
the supply-only components of credit standards for large firms and SMEs. We expect these 
instrumental variables to satisfy the independence assumption because they should be 
uncorrelated with firms’ investment and growth opportunities and aggregate demand effects. 
However, to rule out that the instruments are just proxying the economic cycle and in turn the 
economy-wide investment opportunities, we include, as an additional regressor, the detrended 
level of real GDP. Similar results are found when proxying the economic cycle with the 
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unemployment rate. In addition, we include other country-level determinants of investment 
demand such as the European Commission’s consumer confidence indicator (to measure 
expectations ) and the ten-year government bond yield (to proxy financial conditions).  
Table C1 of Appendix C shows a set of auxiliary estimations in which adjusted credit 
standards are regressed on the economic cycle (proxied by GDP or unemployment rate), the 
consumer confidence indicator, the ten-year government bond yield and the aggregate 
investment growth. The regressions also include country and time fixed effects. Columns (1) and 
(2) show the regressions for adjusted credit standards to SMEs and columns (3) and (4) display 
the regressions for adjusted credit standards to large firms. In columns (1) and (3) the coefficient 
on GDP is significant and with the expected sign, implying that higher GDP is associated with 
easier credit standards. The rest of coefficients are generally insignificant. These results illustrate 
the need to control for the economic cycle, as proxied by the country’s real GDP, in our main 
regressions, so that the instruments satisfy the independence assumption. 
Finally, we use cluster-robust standard errors to allow for potential heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation across groups in the error structure. The selection of the clustering groups 
is specific to the particular regression undertaken and is indicated in the regression output.   
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5 Empirical results  
 
5.1 Overall effects  
Tables 6-8 display the estimation of pooled ordered probit models in which the dependent 
variables are, respectively, investment growth, working capital growth and employment growth. 
Column (1) shows the regression coefficients and columns (2)-(4) the marginal effects of the 
measures of credit constraints (cc_bank and cc_other) on the probability of each alternative 
(decrease, remain unchanged, increase). In terms of the base categories for the firm controls, 
micro firms with turnover less than €500,000 is the omitted category for the size dummies, 
more than 10 years for the age dummies, subsidiary/branch for legal form and publicly-listed 
firms for ownership structure. As in Casey and O’Toole (2014), standard errors are clustered at 
the country-wave level to allow for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the errors across 
firms in the same country in a given wave of the SAFE.37 
Let us start with Table 6. In column (1) the sign of the regression parameters indicates 
whether the latent variable increases or decreases with each regressor. Credit constraints in 
bank financing (cc_bank) and credit constraints in other financing (cc_other) are negatively 
correlated with latent investment growth. Regarding the controls, small and medium firms 
invest more than micro firms, relatively mature firms (between 5 and 10 years) invest more than 
rest of firms and sole traders invest more than the rest. Interestingly, firms whose outlook 
deteriorated or remained unchanged invest less than those whose outlook improved, 
confirming that the enterprise-specific outlook is a good proxy for investment opportunities. In 
order to ascertain the size of these effects, we turn our attention to the marginal effects in 
columns (2)-(4). A credit constrained firm in bank financing (cc_bank=1) has a 2.1 percentage 
point (pp) larger probability of decreasing investment (column (2)) and a 2.8 pp lower probability 
of increasing investment (column (4)). The marginal effects of cc_other are somewhat larger.  
Specifically, a credit constrained firm in other financing (cc_other=1) has a 3.4 percentage point 
(pp) larger probability of decreasing investment (column (2)) and a 4.5 pp lower probability of 
increasing investment (column (4)). Notice that these effects are additive, implying that a firm 
that is constrained in all sorts of financing (cc_bank= cc_other=1) faces a 5.5 pp greater 
likelihood of cutting down investment and a 7.3 pp lower likelihood of raising it.  
Interestingly, column (1) of Table 7 reveals that cc_bank has no significant correlation 
with latent working capital growth, while cc_other is negatively correlated with that variable, 
which may be explained by the crucial role of trade credit in customer-supplier relationships. 
Regarding the controls, firms with turnover greater than € 2 million experience larger increases 
in working capital than the rest of companies, relatively mature firms (between 5 and 10 years) 
experience larger increases in working capital than the rest and autonomous enterprises invest 
more in liquid assets than subsidiaries or branches, probably because of a precautionary 
savings strategy, as they cannot rely on intra-group financing in the event of additional liquidity 
needs. In addition, firms whose outlook deteriorated or remained unchanged invest less in 
working capital than those whose outlook improved. According to columns (2) and (4), a credit 
constrained firm in other financing (cc_other=1) has a 4.9 pp larger probability of decreasing 
                                                                          
37 Alternatively, we have computed standard errors that are two-way clustered at the firm and at the country-wave level, 
to allow for correlation of the error within firms across years and across firms in the same country in a given wave. The 
results, available upon request, are very similar.  
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working capital and a 5.7 pp lower probability of increasing it, while the marginal effects of 
cc_bank are not statistically different from zero.  
A similar picture emerges when we examine the effect of credit constrains on firm 
growth (Table 8). According to Table 8, a firm that is constrained in bank financing has a 2.9 pp 
larger probability of decreasing employment and a 4.1 lower probability of increasing it, while 
the marginal effects of cc_other are not statistically different from zero. Regarding the controls, 
small and medium firms experience higher growth than micro firms and middle-aged firms 
(between 2 and 10 years) experience higher growth than the rest. A deteriorated business 
outlook has a negative impact on firm growth.   
5.2 Heterogeneous effects  
Given that SMEs are a very heterogeneous group of firms, and to provide a more granular 
insight into the real effect of credit constraints, we have estimated the marginal effects of the 
credit constraints variables using the previous model for different values of some firm 
characteristics. Beck et al. (2006) find that, for SMEs, firm age, size and ownership are 
important determinants of firm financing constraints. We therefore estimate the marginal effects 
for different firm groups using these key characteristics.38 In particular, we interact the credit 
constraint variables with the size dummies (micro, small and medium), the age dummies (10 
years or more, 5 to 9 years, 2 to 4 years, less than 2 years) and the ownership dummies (listed 
company, family business, firm owned by another enterprise39, sole trader, other). We then 
regress each dependent variable (investment, working capital, employment) on the control 
variables, the lagged measures of credit constraints, the size/age/ownership dummies and the 
interactions between those variables and the measures of credit constraints. The marginal 
effects of the interactions may differ because the impact of credit constraints can depend on 
firm size, age or ownership structure. The vector of firm-level controls and country-industry-
time dummies is the same as in previous estimations.  
In Table 9 we present the marginal effects of the interactions between the size 
dummies and the credit constraint measures on the probability that the dependent variable 
increases. The omitted category is micro firms. The lower part of the table shows linear 
combinations of the marginal effects to know the impact of credit constraints for small and 
medium firms. In column (1), in which the dependent variable is investment, most interactions 
are insignificant, except for cc_bank*small: small bank constrained firms have a 5.3 pp lower 
probability of increasing investment than otherwise similar micro firms. No interaction is 
significant in column (2), in which the dependent variable is working capital. Finally, in column 
(3), in which the dependent variable is employment, most interactions are insignificant, except 
for cc_other*small: small constrained firms have an 8.1 pp lower probability of increasing 
employment than otherwise similar micro firms.  In addition, notice that the marginal effects on 
cc_bank and cc_other are almost always insignificant, which means that the impact of credit 
constraints on firm outcomes is null in the case of micro firms. Hence, Table 9 suggests that 
most of the impact of credit constraints on real variables is driven by small and medium firms.  
In Table 10 we present the marginal effects of the interactions between the age 
dummies and the credit constraint measures on the probability that the dependent variable 
increases. The omitted category is old firms (10 years or more). Most interactions are 
                                                                          
38 Casey and O’Toole (2014), in their study of the effects of credit constraints on alternative finance usage with the SAFE 
database, also compute marginal effects for those variables.   
39 Due to the low number of observations, the category “owned by venture capital enterprise or business angel” has been 
merged with the category “owned by another enterprise”.  
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insignificant, suggesting that the effects of credit constraints are quite homogeneous and do 
not depend on firm age. Finally, Table 11 displays the marginal effects of the interactions 
between the ownership structure dummies and the credit constraint measures. According to 
the table, the negative effect of credit constraints on employment growth seems to be mainly 
driven by the impact on family businesses and on sole traders, while the rest of ownership 
categories (e.g. listed companies, firms owned by other enterprises) are largely unaffected, 
which is consistent with asymmetric information problems. 
The main upshot of the previous analyses is that the impact of credit constraints on 
firm-level outcomes is broad-based and is largely independent of firm size, age or ownership 
structure. A remarkable exception is the case of micro firms, which seem largely unaffected by 
credit constraints. This finding may be explained by the fact that micro firms rely more on 
internal funds (cashflows and retained earnings) to fund their investment projects, making them 
less sensitive to access to external funds, in spite of being more likely to be financially 
constrained (as shown in Table 5) due to asymmetric information problems.  
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6 Robustness analyses 
6.1 Random effects  
We may also control for firm-level unobserved heterogeneity with a random-effects40 ordered 
probit model. This technique may capture the time-invariant component of investment/growth 
opportunities (i.e., firms with high/low investment opportunities) and help us mitigate the omitted 
variable bias. Tables 12-14 present the estimations of these models, where the same set of firm-
level controls and fixed effects are included. Comparing Tables 6 and 12 (impact on investment), 
the coefficient on cc_bank and cc_other are still statistically significant, but the marginal effects 
are somewhat smaller than those estimated in the baseline specification. When comparing Tables 
7 and 13 (impact on working capital), we see that the coefficients and marginal effects are 
remarkably similar. Finally, the comparison of Tables 8 and 14 (impact on employment growth) 
shows that the coefficient of cc_bank keeps their statistical significance and that the associated 
marginal effects are of similar magnitude, while those of cc_other now become significant. Finally, 
notice that the estimated panel-level variances (i.e., the variances of the random effects) in Tables 
12-14 are large and statistically significant, which suggests that there is enough variability 
between firms to model a random-effects ordered probit, rather than a pooled ordered probit.  
6.2 Subsample of applications and alternative measures of credit constraints  
So far, in order to maximise sample size, our measures of credit constraints have been dummy 
variables that equal 1 for firms that are rejected, quantity rationed, price rationed or discouraged 
from applying (constrained firms), and equal 0 for the rest of firms (unconstrained firms). 
However, the latter is a heterogeneous group that comprises both firms that have successfully 
applied for a loan and firms that have not applied because they do not need it. In particular, firms 
may not apply for a loan because they have sufficient internal funds and because they do not 
have attractive investment opportunities.41 As our aim is to establish a meaningful relationship 
between access to external finance, investment and growth, in robustness we only keep in the 
group of unconstrained firms those that have actually obtained a loan.  
The results, presented in Tables 15-17, are very interesting when compared with the 
baseline results (Tables 6-8). The coefficients on cc_bank are no longer significant, while the 
coefficients and marginal effects of cc_other are always significant and larger than in the 
baseline regressions. For instance, according to Table 15, a firm that is constrained in other 
financing (cc_other=1) has a 4.3 percentage point (pp) larger probability of decreasing 
investment (column (2)) and 5.2 pp lower probability of increasing it (column (4)), effects 
somewhat larger than those reported in Table 6. According to Table 16, a firm that is 
constrained in other financing has a 5.7 percentage point (pp) larger probability of decreasing 
working capital (column (2)) and a 5.7 pp lower probability of increasing it (column (4)), effects 
slightly larger than those reported in Table 7. Finally, according to Table 17, a firm that is 
constrained in other financing has a 6.3 percentage point (pp) larger probability of reducing 
employment (column (2)) and 7.4 pp lower probability of increasing it (column (4)), while 
previously those effects were not significant (Table 8). More generally, the results corroborate 
the negative impact of credit constraints on investment, inventories and other working capital 
and employment dynamics.  
                                                                          
40 Firm fixed effects have not been included because of the limited time variation of the measures of credit constraints in 
such a short panel (2 years).  
41 Question Q7A of SAFE distinguishes between firms that applied for external financing, did not apply because of 
possible rejection, did not apply because of sufficient internal funds and did not apply for other reasons.  
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In addition, we use an alternative measure of credit constraints, problem access 
finance, a variable that indicates how important the problem “access to finance” is to the firm. 
In particular, the firm is asked to assess the importance of a series of problems (finding 
customers, competition, access to finance, costs of production or labour, availability of skilled 
staff, regulation, other) using a scale of 1-10, where 1 means it is not at all important and 10 
means it is extremely important.42 Table 18-20 reports the estimation of ordered probit models 
in which problem_access_finance is the regressor of interest. In the three tables the coefficients 
and marginal effects are significant at the 1% level, although the overall impact is somewhat 
smaller than with the other measures. To assess the economic significance of the effect, let us 
consider that a constrained firm is the one whose value for problem_access_finance is the 75th 
percentile (8) while an unconstrained firm is the one with value equal to the 25th percentile (3), 
so that the size of the effect is the marginal effect times the interquartile range (5). Hence, a 
constrained firm has a 1.5 pp higher probability of decreasing investment and a 2 pp lower 
probability of increasing it than an unconstrained one. Likewise, a constrained firm has a 2.5 pp 
higher probability of decreasing working capital and a 3 pp lower probability of increasing it 
than an unconstrained one. Similar figures are found for employment growth (Table 20). Thus, 
“perceived financing constraints”, as measured through firms’ self-assessment of the barriers 
for access to finance, also help explain firm’s investment, liquid assets and growth. 
6.3 Instrumental variables 
So far our identification strategy has relied on the use of an extensive set of country-industry-
wave effects and firm-level covariates to control for firms’ investment and growth opportunities. 
However, if we are not perfectly controlling for investment opportunities, then the error term will 
be correlated with our credit constraint dummies. Hence, in robustness, we use an 
instrumental variable to isolate the exogenous part of the key regressors.43 The proposed 
instrument, adjusted credit standards, is an ordinal variable that measures the supply-only 
component of credit standards of each country in each round of the SAFE. The variable comes 
from the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey (BLS), a quarterly survey that asks euro area banks about 
developments in their respective credit markets since 2003.44  
In order to implement the IV strategy we first transform our ordinal dependent 
variables, investment growth, working capital growth and employment growth, into dummies 
that equal 1 if investment/working capital/employment has increased and 0 if it has decreased 
or it has remained unchanged. The reason for carrying out such transformation is to be able to 
use standard models for binary dependent variables with endogenous regressors such as two-
stage least squares (linear probability model).  Second, we merge our two key regressors, 
cc_bank and cc_other, into a single variable, cc_all, which equals 1 if the firm is constrained in 
at least one of the two financing sources (i.e., cc_bank=1 and/or cc_other=1) and 0 if the firm 
is constrained in none of them (i.e., cc_bank=cc_other=0). The reason for such transformation 
is that, as Angrist and Pischke (2009) argue, models with multiple endogenous variables are 
                                                                          
42 This question is asked to all firms, unlike the questions used to construct the baseline measure of credit constraints, 
which are only asked to those firms that consider each source of financing relevant. This is the reason why the 
estimation sample is larger.   
43 Ferrando and Mulier (2015b), in their study of the impact of discouragement on investment and firm growth, also follow 
an IV strategy. Specifically, they instrument their dummy for discouraged borrowers with a firm-level financial 
constraints indicator, namely a dummy that equals 1 if the firm considers access to finance as the most pressing 
problem. However, such an instrument is likely to be invalid if lenders observe a firm’s lack of investment opportunities 
and in turn decide to restrain credit, making access to credit the firm’s most pressing problem. To put it differently, 
they instrument a financial constraints indicator, “discouraged borrowers”, with another financial constraints indicator, 
“access to finance as most pressing problem”.  
44 Currently the sample comprises more than 140 banks from 19 euro area countries, with a coverage of around 60% of 
the amount outstanding of loans to the private non-financial sector in the euro area. For information about the survey 
see Köhler-Ulbrich, Hempell and Scopel (2016).   
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hard to identify and the results can be hard to interpret, so we prefer to estimate a regression 
model with a single endogenous covariate. 
Table 21 presents the results of linear probability models estimated by OLS and 
instrumental variable methods, in which the dependent variable is investment growth. All time-
varying controls are lagged one period, while the endogenous regressor cc_all and the 
instruments adjusted credit standards are included contemporaneously (at time t). All 
specifications include country, industry and time dummies.45 We also report the first-stage F-
statistic, the Sargan-Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions and two endogeneity tests on 
cc_all, one based on the first-stage residuals, as suggested by Wooldridge (2003)46, and 
another one based on the difference of two Sargan statistics.47 
Column (1), estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), shows a negative and strong 
correlation between cc_all and investment growth. However, to establish a causal relationship we 
need to make use of our instrumental variables. First we use a single instrumental variable, 
adjusted credit standards in loans to SMEs. The first-stage is strong. According to column 2, a unit 
increase in the level of credit standards (i.e., tightening) increases the likelihood of being credit 
constrained by around 10 percentage points, and the effect is statistically significant at a 1% level. 
The instrument does not seem to be weak, as the value of the first-stage F-statistic is 11.7, well 
above 10, the reference value suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). The reduced form is also 
strong, implying that the instrument has a significant effect on the outcome variable. According to 
column 3, a unit tightening in the level of credit standards reduces the probability that investment 
increases by 6.6 pp. The Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)48 estimates that result from the 
estimation of the first-stage and the reduced form are displayed in column (4). According to those 
estimates, the presence of credit constraints reduces by 67 pp the probability of increasing 
investment, but the effect is estimated imprecisely and it is only statistically significant at 10%. The 
two endogeneity tests reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of cc_all, suggesting that we need to 
pay more attention to the IV estimates, as OLS is likely to be inconsistent. To increase the precision 
of the estimates we follow two approaches. First, we include random effects by estimating the 
structural equation by Generalised Two-Stage Least Squares (G2SLS). The results are displayed in 
column (5). As expected, the standard error decreases somewhat, while the coefficient increases 
substantially: the presence of credit constraints reduces by 88 pp the probability of increasing 
investment, and the effect is significant at 1%. Second, we add a second instrumental variable, the 
adjusted credit standards in loans to large firms, and estimate the over-identified model via 2SLS. 
The result, displayed in column (6), is a very strong and precise effect: credit constraints reduce the 
probability of an increase in investment by 92 pp, and the coefficient is significant at 5%. Notice 
that the Sargan-Hansen J-test cannot reject the validity of the over-identifying restrictions.49  
                                                                          
45 Very similar results are found if we use country-sector and sector-time dummies.  
46 Wooldridge’s (2003) endogeneity test is carried out by including the first-stage residuals in the structural equation and 
testing their significance via a t-test. If they are significant, we reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. See Wooldridge 
(2003), pages 506-507. 
47 The endogeneity test is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation with the smaller 
set of instruments, where the suspect regressors are treated as endogenous, and one for the equation with the larger 
set of instruments, where the suspect regressors are treated as exogenous. Under the null hypothesis the specified 
endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous. Under conditional homoskedasticity, this endogeneity 
test statistic is numerically equal to a Hausman test statistic; see Hayashi (2000, pp. 233-34). 
48 We prefer to estimate linear probability models via 2SLS, rather than an IV Probit, because the endogenous regressor 
is a binary variable, implying that the joint normality assumption of the IV Probit would be violated.  See Wooldridge 
(2004), pages 472-477. 
49 However, Parente and Santos Silva (2012) argue that this test cannot be used to check the exogeneity of the 
instruments because the validity of the overidentifying restrictions is neither sufficient nor necessary for the validity of 
the moment conditions implied by the underlying economic model. 
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The IV estimate is remarkably larger than the OLS estimate, suggesting that the latter 
underestimate the casual effect of credit constraints on investment growth. Notice that, 
following Imbens and Angrist (1994), we can interpret the IV estimate as the Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE). The LATE is the average treatment effect on the subpopulation of 
compliers, who are the individuals whose treatment status changes when the value of the 
instrumental variable changes as well. IV methods are uninformative for always-takers (the ones 
that always receive the treatment, irrespective of the value of the IV) and never-takers (the ones 
that never receive the treatment) because the instrument is unrelated to their treatment 
status.50 In our empirical application, compliers are the firms that become financially 
constrained (unconstrained) when credits standards are tightened (eased), always-takers are 
the firms that are always financially constrained, regardless of the levels of credit standards, 
and never-takers are the firms that are never financially constrained.51 Our estimates suggest a 
very strong causal effect on the subpopulation of complier firms, which is expected to differ 
from the average causal effect for the entire treated population (the treatment effect on the 
treated) because of the existence of always-takers.  
The impact of credit constraints on working capital growth is displayed in Table 22. 
The OLS estimates (column 1) are significant at 1%, suggesting a strong correlation between 
credit constraints and working capital. However, the reduced form (column 3) shows no impact 
of the instrument on working capital. In turn, the estimation of the structural equation by 2SLS 
(column 4) reveals no effect. The same is true when we add random effects to the model and 
estimate it by G2SLS (column 5). We do not report the results with the over-identified model 
because the first-stage F-test falls below 10, but the conclusion is similar. Nevertheless, the 
two endogeneity tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of cc_all (p-values around 
0.5). This means that both the OLS results and the IV results are likely to be valid. Hence, we 
can conclude that the effect of credit constraints on working capital is either null (as suggested 
by the IV estimates) or quite small (as suggested by the OLS estimates).  
The impact of credit constraints on firm growth is presented in Table 23. According to 
the OLS estimates (column 1), a credit constrained firm has a 6 pp lower probability of increasing 
employment than an otherwise identical firm, and the effect is statistically significant at 1%. By 
contrast, the estimation of the structural equation by 2SLS (column 4) shows no statistically 
significant effect of credit constraints on employment growth. The effect becomes significant, but 
only at the 10% level, when we add random effects to the model and estimate it by G2SLS 
(column 5). As the two endogeneity tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of cc_all 
(p-values above 0.4), both the OLS and the IV estimates are likely to be valid. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the effect of credit constraints on employment growth is either null (as suggested 
by the IV estimates) or quite small (as suggested by the OLS estimates). 
Therefore, the results of this section suggest a strong causal impact of overall credit 
constraints on firm investment, while the effects on firm growth and working capital are weaker 
and less robust.  
 
                                                                          
50 The distinction between compliers, always-takers and never-takers is detailed in Angrist et al. (1996).  
51 In principle, there could be a fourth category, defiers, which would be the firms that become credit constrained as 
credit standards are eased and unconstrained as credit standards are tightened. However, this seems unlikely, 
implying that our empirical application satisfies the so-called monotonicity assumption. This assumption, together with 
the exclusion restriction and a nonzero first stage, ensures the identification of the LATE. See Imbens and Angrist 
(1994) for details.  
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7 Conclusions 
In frictionless perfect capital markets, the Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958) implies that a firm’s 
financing decisions are independent from its investment decisions because internal and 
external funds are perfect substitutes. In practice, however, several factors lead to an imperfect 
substitutability between internal and external funds52, so that financial constraints may have 
important effects on real variables such as investment, inventories and other working capital 
and firm growth. The purpose of this research is to test this empirical prediction. We do so with 
the Survey on the access to finance of enterprises (SAFE), a survey that is especially designed 
to analyse the problems in the access to external finance faced by European SMEs. In 
particular, we use a panel of about 5,000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from 12 
European countries for the period 2014-2016. In line with previous studies on the SAFE, we 
develop several survey-based indicators of credit constraints, distinguishing between 
constraints in the access to bank finance (bank loans, bank overdrafts, credit lines) and in the 
access to other finance (trade credit, leasing, factoring, debt and equity securities, etc). 
Our goal is to identify the causal effect of credit constraints on investment, inventories 
and other working capital and firm growth. The key identification challenge we face is a 
potential reverse-causality bias, as we expect firms with poor investment/growth opportunities 
to have a higher probability of being credit constrained. We implement several strategies to 
overcome this obstacle: proxies for investment opportunities, lagged regressors, random 
effects and instrumental variables. Our findings suggest that credit constraints, both in bank 
financing and other financing, have strong negative effects on investment in fixed assets, while 
the impact on firm growth and  working capital is less robust.  
In addition, we analyse heterogeneous effects by estimating average marginal effects for 
different types of firms. A remarkable result is that micro firms (less than 10 employees) are largely 
unaffected by credit constraints, probably because those firms rely more on internal funds 
(cashflows and retained earnings) to fund their investment projects, making them less sensitive to 
access to external funds, in spite of being more likely to be financially constrained due to 
asymmetric information problems. This result complements those of Beck et al. (2005), who find 
that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) face greater financial, legal and corruption 
obstacles compared to large firms and the constraining impact of obstacles on firm growth is 
inversely related to firm size. However, Beck et al. (2005) compare SMEs with large firms, while 
we compare micro, small and medium-sized firms. Hence, the effect of credit constraints on firm 
investment and growth may be a non-monotonic (concave) function of firm size.  
Our paper contributes to a new emerging strand of the literature that uses survey data 
to construct direct measures of financial constraints (Campello et al., 2010, Ferrando and 
Mulier, 2015b). First, it extends the work of Ferrando and Mulier (2015b) on discouraged 
borrowers to both “formal” and “informal” credit constraints (discouragement, quantity 
rationing, price rationing, rejected applications) and assesses the role of all sources of 
financing, not only bank loans, in shaping business decisions. It also covers a larger number of 
countries and analyses the recovery period of the European economy (2014-2016), unlike 
previous studies that have focused on the last recession. It also looks at the impact of financial 
constraints on inventories and other working capital, an aspect that has traditionally been 
                                                                          
52 See Fazzari et al. (1988) and Schiantarelli (1996) for a review of the theoretical research in this area.  
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overlooked in the literature. Finally, it attempts to establish a causal link between credit 
constraints and firm investment, inventories and growth by exploiting the panel nature of the 
data and by making use of an instrumental variable to isolate the exogenous part of credit 
constraints. 
Finally, notice that our results are conservative measures of the total impact of credit 
constraints in the real economy, as our analysis ignores the extensive margin, i.e., those 
businesses that shut down because of a lack of credit and those firms that do not enter the 
market because they do not obtain financing to undertake their investment projects. 
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Table 1: variables description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
country 12 European countries
sector industry, construction, wholesale or retail trade, other services
size_employment 1 (micro), 2 (small), 3 (medium)
size_turnover 1(<= € 500,000), 2 (€500,000 ‐ €1 million), 3 (€ 1 million ‐ € 2 million)
4 (€ 2 million ‐ €10 million), 5 (€10 million ‐ €50 million), 6 (> € 50 million)
age >=10 years, >=5 and <10 years, >=2 and <5 years, <2 years
legal form subsidiary or branch, autonomous entreprise
ownership structure public shareholders, family or entrepreneurs, other entreprises, 
venture capital entreprises, one owner only, other
exporter 0,1
cc_all 0,1
cc_bank 0,1
cc_other 0,1
problem_access_finance 1‐10
investment growth decreased, remain unchanged, increased
working capital growth decreased, remain unchanged, increased
employment growth decreased, remain unchanged, increased
turnover decreased, remain unchanged, increased
profits decreased, remain unchanged, increased
labour_costs decreased, remain unchanged, increased
other_costs decreased, remain unchanged, increased
interest_expenses decreased, remain unchanged, increased
debt_to_assets decreased, remain unchanged, increased
enterprise_outlook improved, remain unchanged, deteriorated
enterpise_capital improved, remain unchanged, deteriorated
credit_history improved, remain unchanged, deteriorated
Variable Possible values
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Table 2: descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
investment growth: decrease 19,989 0.16 0.37 0 1
investment growth: unchanged 19,989 0.56 0.50 0 1
investment growth: increase 19,989 0.28 0.45 0 1
working capital growth: decrease 19,989 0.18 0.38 0 1
working capital growth: unchanged 19,989 0.60 0.49 0 1
working capital growth: increase 19,989 0.22 0.42 0 1
employment growth: decrease 19,989 0.16 0.36 0 1
employment growth: unchanged 19,989 0.58 0.49 0 1
employment growth: increase 19,989 0.26 0.44 0 1
Credit constraints variables
cc_all 19,989 0.19 0.39 0 1
cc_bank 19,989 0.16 0.36 0 1
cc_other 19,989 0.10 0.31 0 1
problem_access_finance 19,845 5.69 2.91 1 10
Other controls
turnover: decrease 19,989 0.24 0.43 0 1
turnover: unchanged 19,989 0.33 0.47 0 1
turnover: increase 19,989 0.42 0.49 0 1
profits: decrease 19,989 0.34 0.47 0 1
profits: unchanged 19,989 0.34 0.47 0 1
profits: increase 19,989 0.32 0.47 0 1
labour_costs: decrease 19,989 0.07 0.25 0 1
labour_costs: unchanged 19,989 0.40 0.49 0 1
labour_costs: increase 19,989 0.54 0.50 0 1
other_costs: decrease 19,989 0.10 0.30 0 1
other_costs: unchanged 19,989 0.42 0.49 0 1
other_costs: increase 19,989 0.48 0.50 0 1
interest_expenses: decrease 19,989 0.27 0.44 0 1
interest_expenses: unchanged 19,989 0.50 0.50 0 1
interest_expenses: increase 19,989 0.24 0.43 0 1
debt_to_assets: decrease 19,989 0.29 0.45 0 1
debt_to_assets: unchanged 19,989 0.49 0.50 0 1
debt_to_assets: increase 19,989 0.21 0.41 0 1
enterprise outlook: improved 19,989 0.34 0.47 0 1
enterprise outlook: unchanged 19,989 0.44 0.50 0 1
enterprise outlook: deteriorated 19,989 0.21 0.41 0 1
enterprise_capital: improved 19,989 0.31 0.46 0 1
enterprise_capital: unchanged 19,989 0.55 0.50 0 1
enterprise_capital: deteriorated 19,989 0.14 0.34 0 1
credit_history: improved 19,989 0.32 0.47 0 1
credit history: unchanged 19,989 0.57 0.50 0 1
credit history: deteriorated 19,989 0.12 0.32 0 1
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Table 3: correlations among measures of financial constraints 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Cramer’s V among the dependent variables 
 
 
 
  
problem
access_finance cc_all cc_bank cc_other
problem_access_finance 1.00
cc_all 0.36 1.00
cc_bank 0.35 0.91 1.00
cc_other 0.27 0.76 0.52 1.00
investment working capital employment
growth growth growth
investment growth 1.00
working capital growth 0.25 1.00
employment growth 0.20 0.22 1.00
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Table 5: credit constraints in bank financing conditional on firm characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cc_bank=0 cc_bank=1
sector
Industry 86.80 13.20
Construction 83.47 16.53
Wholesale or retail trade 84.80 13.92
Other services 86.13 13.37
size_employment
Micro 81.67 18.33
Small 86.28 13.72
Medium 91.00 9.00
size_turnover
1 79.89 20.11
2 83.81 16.19
3 84.37 15.63
4 88.30 11.70
5 91.52 8.48
6 95.06 4.94
age
>=10 years 86.12 13.88
>=5 and <10 years 84.24 15.76
>=2 and <5 years 82.06 17.94
<2 years 81.17 18.83
legal form
Subsidiary or branch 90.16 9.84
Autonomous enterprise 85.18 14.82
ownership structure
Public shareholders 90.77 9.23
Family or entrepreneurs 85.10 14.90
Other entreprises 90.65 9.35
Venture capital enterprises 84.14 15.86
Sole trader 84.56 15.44
Other 89.72 10.28
exporter
0 85.05 14.95
1 86.28 13.72
country
less vulnerable 87.96 12.04
vulnerable 81.05 18.95
Percent
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Table 6: impact of credit constraints on investment, coefficients and marginal effects 
 
  
COEFFICIENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE investment growth P(investment=decrease) P(investment=unchanged) P(investment=increase)
cc_bank (t‐1) ‐0.095** 0.021** 0.007** ‐0.028**
(0.041) (0.009) (0.003) (0.012)
cc_other (t‐1) ‐0.151*** 0.034*** 0.012*** ‐0.045***
(0.058) (0.013) (0.004) (0.017)
size_employment_2 0.127***
(0.045)
size_employment_3 0.161**
(0.065)
size_turnover_2 ‐0.011
(0.048)
size_turnover_3 0.001
(0.066)
size_turnover_4 0.080
(0.057)
size_turnover_5 0.000
(0.072)
size_turnover_6 0.136
(0.091)
>=5 and <10 years 0.125*
(0.068)
>=2 and <5 years 0.037
(0.094)
<2 years 0.515
(0.337)
autonomous enterprise ‐0.012
(0.077)
family or entrepreneurs 0.201
(0.125)
other enterprises 0.173
(0.143)
venture capital enterprises ‐0.004
(0.221)
sole trader 0.263**
(0.112)
other 0.354**
(0.173)
exporter ‐0.020
(0.032)
outlook: unchanged ‐0.104***
(0.029)
outlook: deteriorated ‐0.260***
(0.058)
COUNTRY‐INDUSTRY‐TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
CONTROLS NO YES YES YES
OTHER CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,162 7,162 7,162 7,162
Pseudo‐R2 0,0519
Dependent variable: investment growth. Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and dummies for 
improvement/deterioration of  enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once (t‐1).
Estimator: ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MARGINAL EFFECTS
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Table 7: impact of credit constraints on working capital, coefficients 
and marginal effects 
 
  
COEFFICIENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE working capital growth P(working capital=decrease) P(working capital=unchanged) P(working capital=increase)
cc_bank (t‐1) ‐0.001 0.000 0.000 ‐0.000
(0.053) (0.012) (0.002) (0.014)
cc_other (t‐1) ‐0.213*** 0.049*** 0.008*** ‐0.057***
(0.080) (0.018) (0.003) (0.021)
size_employment_2 ‐0.027
(0.048)
size_employment_3 ‐0.059
(0.058)
size_turnover_2 ‐0.032
(0.058)
size_turnover_3 0.044
(0.069)
size_turnover_4 0.213***
(0.056)
size_turnover_5 0.316***
(0.072)
size_turnover_6 0.359***
(0.136)
>=5 and <10 years 0.123***
(0.041)
>=2 and <5 years 0.088
(0.071)
<2 years ‐0.080
(0.174)
autonomous enterprise 0.077*
(0.047)
family or entrepreneurs 0.102
(0.115)
other enterprises 0.099
(0.132)
venture capital enterprises 0.182
(0.254)
sole trader 0.086
(0.125)
other 0.124
(0.162)
exporter 0.026
(0.037)
outlook: unchanged ‐0.143***
(0.038)
outlook: deteriorated ‐0.217***
(0.063)
COUNTRY‐INDUSTRY‐TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
CONTROLS NO YES YES YES
OTHER CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,232 7,232 7,232 7,232
Pseudo‐R2 0,0644
Dependent variable: working capital growth. Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and dummies for 
improvement/deterioration of  enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once (t‐1).
Estimator: ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MARGINAL EFFECTS
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Table 8: impact of credit constraints on employment, coefficients 
and marginal effects 
  
COEFFICIENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE employment growth P(employment=decrease) P(employment=unchanged) P(employment=increase)
cc_bank (t‐1) ‐0.141*** 0.029*** 0.012*** ‐0.041***
(0.048) (0.010) (0.004) (0.014)
cc_other (t‐1) ‐0.092 0.019 0.008 ‐0.027
(0.072) (0.015) (0.006) (0.021)
size_employment_2 0.186***
(0.041)
size_employment_3 0.370***
(0.047)
size_turnover_2 0.001
(0.041)
size_turnover_3 ‐0.006
(0.050)
size_turnover_4 0.052
(0.054)
size_turnover_5 0.017
(0.082)
size_turnover_6 ‐0.102
(0.112)
>=5 and <10 years 0.123***
(0.043)
>=2 and <5 years 0.281***
(0.068)
<2 years ‐0.018
(0.337)
autonomous enterprise 0.131**
(0.061)
family or entrepreneurs 0.042
(0.104)
other enterprises ‐0.016
(0.108)
venture capital enterprises 0.402
(0.272)
sole trader 0.121
(0.115)
other 0.053
(0.143)
exporter 0.004
(0.030)
outlook: unchanged ‐0.019
(0.044)
outlook: deteriorated ‐0.191***
(0.061)
COUNTRY‐INDUSTRY‐TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
CONTROLS NO YES YES YES
OTHER CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,318 7,318 7,318 7,318
Pseudo‐R2 0,0728
Dependent variable: employment growth. Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and dummies for 
improvement/deterioration of enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once (t‐1).
Estimator: ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MARGINAL EFFECTS
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Table 9: marginal effects of credit constraints for different size categories 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
DEP. VARIABLE investment working_capital employment
cc_bank  ‐0.006 0.001 ‐0.035
(0.017) (0.024) (0.022)
cc_bank*small ‐0.053* 0.022 ‐0.000
(0.032) (0.038) (0.028)
cc_bank*medium ‐0.021 ‐0.037 ‐0.021
(0.030) (0.030) (0.045)
cc_other  ‐0.051* ‐0.045 0.003
(0.031) (0.031) (0.025)
cc_other*small 0.028 ‐0.045 ‐0.087**
(0.049) (0.038) (0.036)
cc_other*medium ‐0.013 0.014 ‐0.016
(0.042) (0.044) (0.039)
Observations 7,162 7,232 7,318
cc_bank + cc_bank*small  ‐0.059*** 0.022 ‐0.036
cc_bank + cc_bank*medium ‐0.027 ‐0.036 ‐0.057
cc_other + cc_other*small ‐0.023 ‐0.090***  ‐0.084***
cc_other + cc_other*medium ‐0.064**  ‐0.032 ‐0.013
P(DEPENDENT VARIABLE=INCREASE)
Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses 
and dummies for improvement/deterioration of enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying variables are lagged once (t‐1). Country‐industry‐time dummies included in all specifications. 
Estimator: ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The omitted category is micro firms. 
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Table 10: marginal effects of credit constraints for different age categories 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
DEP. VARIABLE investment working_capital employment
cc_bank  ‐0.045*** ‐0.007 ‐0.050***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.015)
cc_bank*(5 to 9 years) 0.113** 0.037 0.055
(0.052) (0.035) (0.047)
cc_bank*(2 to 4 years) 0.041 0.010 0.014
(0.065) (0.073) (0.070)
cc_bank*(Less than 2 years) 0.021 0.081 0.033
(0.175) (0.115) (0.145)
cc_other  ‐0.035* ‐0.063*** ‐0.023
(0.019) (0.022) (0.023)
cc_other*(5 to 9 years) ‐0.090 0.010 ‐0.054
(0.059) (0.039) (0.048)
cc_other*(2 to 4 years) 0.079 0.039 ‐0.019
(0.078) (0.071) (0.114)
cc_other*(Less than 2 years) 0.025 0.381 0.359
(0.117) (0.247) (0.312)
Observations 7,162 7,232 7,318
P(DEPENDENT VARIABLE=INCREASE)
Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses 
and dummies for improvement/deterioration of enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying variables are lagged once (t‐1). Country‐industry‐time dummies included in all specifications. 
Estimator: ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The omitted category is firms with 10 years or more. 
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Table 11: marginal effects of credit constraints for different ownership categories 
  
(1) (2) (3)
DEP. VARIABLE investment working_capital employment
cc_bank  ‐0.042 ‐0.004 ‐0.048
(0.119) (0.132) (0.144)
cc_bank*(Family or enterpreneurs) 0.022 ‐0.019 0.012
(0.122) (0.132) (0.145)
cc_bank*(Other enterprises) ‐0.018 ‐0.046 ‐0.005
(0.127) (0.135) (0.150)
cc_bank*(Sole trader) 0.011 0.041 0.005
(0.121) (0.137) (0.144)
cc_bank*(Other) ‐0.059 0.175 ‐0.032
(0.170) (0.181) (0.184)
cc_other  0.067 ‐0.033 0.192
(0.104) (0.091) (0.129)
cc_other*(Family or enterpreneurs) ‐0.115 ‐0.013 ‐0.223*
(0.107) (0.094) (0.128)
cc_other*(Other enterprises) ‐0.132 ‐0.014 ‐0.133
(0.115) (0.118) (0.147)
cc_other*(Sole trader) ‐0.100 ‐0.030 ‐0.247**
(0.114) (0.098) (0.124)
cc_other*(Other) ‐0.149 ‐0.177 ‐0.134
(0.147) (0.123) (0.159)
Observations 7,162 7,232 7,318
P(DEPENDENT VARIABLE=INCREASE)
Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses 
and dummies for improvement/deterioration of enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying variables are lagged once (t‐1). Country‐industry‐time dummies included in all specifications. 
Estimator: ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The omitted category is listed firms. 
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Table 12: impact of credit constraints on investment (random effects) 
 
Table 13: impact of credit constraints on working capital (random effects) 
 
  
COEFFICIENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE investment growth P(investment=decrease) P(investment=unchanged) P(investment=increase)
cc_bank (t‐1) ‐0.074*** 0.014*** 0.005*** ‐0.019***
(0.022) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
cc_other (t‐1) ‐0.130* 0.025* 0.009* ‐0.034*
(0.076) (0.015) (0.005) (0.020)
COUNTRY‐INDUSTRY‐TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
OTHER CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Panel‐level variance component 0.369***
(0.050)
Observations 7,162 7,162 7,162 7,162
Number of firms 4,880 4,880 4,880 4,880
Dependent variable: investment growth. Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and dummies for 
improvement/deterioration of  enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once. 
Estimator: random effects ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MARGINAL EFFECTS
COEFFICIENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE working capital growth P(working capital=decrease) P(working capital=unchanged) P(working capital=increase)
cc_bank (t‐1) 0.008 ‐0.002 ‐0.000 0.002
(0.054) (0.010) (0.002) (0.012)
cc_other (t‐1) ‐0.246** 0.048** 0.008** ‐0.056**
(0.120) (0.022) (0.004) (0.026)
COUNTRY‐INDUSTRY‐TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
OTHER CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Panel‐level variance component 0.384***
(0.057)
Observations 7,232 7,232 7,232 7,232
Number of firms 4,911 4,911 4,911 4,911
Dependent variable: working capital growth.Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and dummies for 
improvement/deterioration of  enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once. 
Estimator:  random effects ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MARGINAL EFFECTS
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Table 14: impact of credit constraints on employment (random effects) 
 
Table 15: impact of credit constraints on investment growth 
(subsample of applications) 
 
Table 16: impact of credit constraints on working capital (subsample of applications) 
COEFFICIENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE employment growth P(employment=decrease) P(employment=unchanged) P(employment=increase)
cc_bank (t‐1) ‐0.141*** 0.025*** 0.011*** ‐0.036***
(0.048) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012)
cc_other (t‐1) ‐0.091** 0.016** 0.007** ‐0.023**
(0.037) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009)
COUNTRY‐INDUSTRY‐TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
OTHER CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Panel‐level variance component 0.349***
(0.052)
Observations 7,318 7,318 7,318 7,318
Number of firms 4,966 4,966 4,966 4,966
Dependent variable: employment growth. Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and dummies for 
improvement/deterioration of enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once. 
Estimator:  random effects ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MARGINAL EFFECTS
COEFFICIENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE investment growth P(investment=decrease) P(investment=unchanged) P(investment=increase)
cc_bank (t‐1) ‐0.110 0.026 0.005 ‐0.031
(0.080) (0.018) (0.004) (0.022)
cc_other (t‐1) ‐0.187** 0.043** 0.009** ‐0.052**
(0.079) (0.018) (0.004) (0.022)
COUNTRY‐INDUSTRY‐TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
OTHER CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,895 1,895 1,895 2,136
Pseudo‐R2 0.1208
Dependent variable: investment growth. Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and dummies for 
improvement/deterioration of enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once (t‐1).
Estimator: ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MARGINAL EFFECTS
COEFFICIENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE working capital growth P(working capital=decrease) P(working capital=unchanged) P(working capital=increase)
cc_bank (t‐1) 0.059 ‐0.015 0.000 0.015
(0.098) (0.025) (0.000) (0.025)
cc_other (t‐1) ‐0.226** 0.057** ‐0.000 ‐0.057**
(0.098) (0.025) (0.000) (0.024)
COUNTRY‐INDUSTRY‐TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
OTHER CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,913 1,913 1,913 1,913
Pseudo‐R2 0.1189
Dependent variable: working capital growth. Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and dummies for 
improvement/deterioration of enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once (t‐1).
Estimator: ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MARGINAL EFFECTS
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Table 17: impact of credit constraints on employment growth 
(subsample of applications) 
 
Table 18: impact of problems in access to finance on investment, coefficients 
and marginal effects 
 
Table 19: impact of problems in access to finance on working capital, coefficients 
and marginal effects 
 
  
COEFFICIENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE employment growth P(employment=decrease) P(employment=unchanged) P(employment=increase)
cc_bank (t‐1) 0.032 ‐0.007 ‐0.001 0.008
(0.066) (0.015) (0.003) (0.017)
cc_other (t‐1) ‐0.279*** 0.063*** 0.011*** ‐0.074***
(0.089) (0.020) (0.004) (0.024)
COUNTRY‐INDUSTRY‐TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
OTHER CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,929 1,929 1,929 1,929
Pseudo‐R2 0.1391
Dependent variable: employment growth. Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and dummies for 
improvement/deterioration of enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once (t‐1).
Estimator: ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MARGINAL EFFECTS
COEFFICIENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE investment growth P(investment=decrease) P(investment=unchanged) P(investment=increase)
problem_access_finance (t‐1) ‐0.014*** 0.003*** 0.001*** ‐0.004***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
COUNTRY‐INDUSTRY‐WAVE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
OTHER CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Observations 10,588 10,588 10,588 10,588
Pseudo‐R2 0,0403
Dependent variable: investment growth. Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form,ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and dummies for 
improvement/deterioration of  enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once (t‐1)
Estimator: ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MARGINAL EFFECTS
COEFFICIENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE working capital growth P(working capital=decrease) P(working capital=unchanged) P(working capital=increase)
problem_access_finance (t‐1) ‐0.023*** 0.005*** 0.001*** ‐0.006***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
COUNTRY‐INDUSTRY‐WAVE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
OTHER CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Observations 10,698 10,698 10,698 10,698
Pseudo‐R2 0,0612
Dependent variable: working capital growth. Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and dummies for 
improvement/deterioration of  enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once (t‐1)
Estimator: ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MARGINAL EFFECTS
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Table 20: impact of problems in access to finance on employment, coefficients 
and marginal effects 
 
Table 21: impact of credit constraints on investment (OLS and IV estimates) 
 
  
COEFFICIENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE employment growth P(employment=decrease) P(employment=unchanged) P(employment=increase)
problem_access_finance (t‐1) ‐0.024*** 0.005*** 0.002*** ‐0.007***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
COUNTRY‐INDUSTRY‐WAVE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
OTHER CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Observations 10,843 10,843 10,843 10,843
Pseudo‐R2 0,0673
Dependent variable: employment growth. Controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and dummies for 
improvement/deterioration of enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once (t‐1)
Estimator: ordered probit. Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MARGINAL EFFECTS
Structural equation First‐stage Reduced form Structural equation Structural equation Structural equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE investment growth cc_all (t) investment growth investment growth investment growth investment growth
cc_all (t) ‐0.096*** ‐0.668* ‐0.878*** ‐0.917**
(0.019) (0.387) (0.338) (0.360)
credit standards sme (t) 0.099*** ‐0.066**
(0.029) (0.029)
ESTIMATOR OLS OLS OLS 2SLS G2SLS 2SLS
INSTRUMENTS credit standards sme credit standards sme credit standards sme
credit standards large
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES
INDUSTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES
TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES
MACRO CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES
FIRM CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES
OTHER FIRM CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES
F‐TEST (FIRST‐STAGE) 11.711 11.711  11.510
P‐VALUE TEST OF OVERIDENTIFICATION RESTRICTIONS Exactly identified 0.291
P‐VALUE ENDOGENEITY TEST (RESIDUALS) 0.004
P‐VALUE ENDOGENEITY TEST (DIFFERENCE IN SARGAN) 0.100
Observations 7,506 7,506 7,506 7,506 7,506 7,506
Number of firms 4,863 4,863 4,863 4,863 4,863 4,863
The instrumental variables are adjusted credit standards in loans to SMEs and adjusted credit standards in loans to large firms.
Macro controls are detrended real GDP, consumer confidence indicator and the 10 year government bond yield.
Firm controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other firm controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and 
dummies for improvement/deterioration of  enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once (t‐1). 
Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
F‐test (first‐stage) is the Kleibergen‐Paap Wald rk F statistic. 
The test of overidentification restrictions is the Sargan‐Hansen J‐test. 
The endogeneity test (residuals) is carried out by including the first‐stage residuals in the structural equation and testing their significance via a t‐test. If they are significant, 
we reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. 
The endogeneity test (difference in Sargan) is defined as the difference  of two Sargan‐Hansen statistics:  one for the equation with the smaller set of instruments,  where the suspect regressors
are treated as endogenous, and one for the equation with the larger set of instruments, where the suspect regressors are treated as exogenous. Under the null hypothesis the specified endogenous
regressors can actually be treated as exogenous. 
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Table 22: impact of credit constraints on working capital (OLS and IV estimates) 
 
Table 23: impact of credit constraints on employment growth (OLS and IV estimates) 
Structural equation First‐stage Reduced form Structural equation Structural equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE working capital growth cc_all (t) working capital growth working capital growth working capital growth
cc_all (t) ‐0.041*** 0.158 ‐0.026
(0.015) (0.279) (0.304)
credit standards sme (t) 0.094*** 0.015
(0.030) (0.027)
ESTIMATOR OLS OLS OLS 2SLS G2SLS
INSTRUMENTS credit standards sme credit standards sme
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES
INDUSTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES
TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES
MACRO CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES
FIRM CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES
OTHER FIRM CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES
F‐TEST (FIRST‐STAGE) 10.115 10.115
P‐VALUE TEST OF OVERIDENTIFICATION RESTRICTIONS Exactly identified
P‐VALUE ENDOGENEITY TEST (RESIDUALS) 0.499  
P‐VALUE ENDOGENEITY TEST (DIFFERENCE IN SARGAN) 0.496
Observations 7,561 7,561 7,561 7,561 7,561
Number of firms 4,893 4,893 4,893 4,893 4,893
The instrumental variables are adjusted credit standards in loans to SMEs and adjusted credit standards in loans to large firms.
Macro controls are detrended real GDP, consumer confidence indicator and the 10 year government bond yield.
Firm controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other firm controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and 
dummies for improvement/deterioration of  enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once (t‐1). 
Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
F‐test (first‐stage) is the Kleibergen‐Paap Wald rk F statistic. 
The test of overidentification restrictions is the Sargan‐Hansen J‐test. 
The endogeneity test (residuals) is carried out by including the first‐stage residuals in the structural equation and testing their significance via a t‐test. If they are significant, 
we reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. 
The endogeneity test (difference in Sargan) is defined as the difference  of two Sargan‐Hansen statistics:  one for the equation with the smaller set of instruments,  where the suspect regressors
are treated as endogenous, and one for the equation with the larger set of instruments, where the suspect regressors are treated as exogenous. Under the null hypothesis the specified endogenous
regressors can actually be treated as exogenous. 
Structural equation First‐stage Reduced form Structural equation Structural equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE employment growth cc_all (t) employment growth employment growth employment growth
cc_all (t) ‐0.060*** 0.298 ‐0.562*
(0.015) (0.439) (0.328)
credit standards sme (t) 0.095*** 0.028
(0.029) (0.045)
ESTIMATOR OLS OLS OLS 2SLS G2SLS
INSTRUMENTS credit standards sme credit standards sme
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES
INDUSTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES
TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES
MACRO CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES
FIRM CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES
OTHER FIRM CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES
F‐TEST (FIRST‐STAGE) 10.687 10.687
P‐VALUE TEST OF OVERIDENTIFICATION RESTRICTIONS Exactly identified
P‐VALUE ENDOGENEITY TEST (RESIDUALS)  0.429 
P‐VALUE ENDOGENEITY TEST (DIFFERENCE IN SARGAN) 0.465
Observations 7,644 7,644 7,644 7,644 7,644
Number of firms 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935
The instrumental variables are adjusted credit standards in loans to SMEs and adjusted credit standards in loans to large firms.
Macro controls are detrended real GDP, consumer confidence indicator and the 10 year government bond yield.
Firm controls are dummies for size (in terms of employment and turnover), age, legal form, ownership structure and exporter.
Other firm controls are dummies for increase/decrease in turnover, profits, labour costs, other costs, debt‐to‐assets and interest expenses and 
dummies for improvement/deterioration of  enterprise‐specific outlook, enterprise's own capital and enterprise's credit history. 
All time‐varying controls are lagged once (t‐1). 
Cluster‐robust standard errors in parentheses.  Cluster level: country‐wave. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
F‐test (first‐stage) is the Kleibergen‐Paap Wald rk F statistic. 
The test of overidentification restrictions is the Sargan‐Hansen J‐test. 
The endogeneity test (residuals) is carried out by including the first‐stage residuals in the structural equation and testing their significance via a t‐test. If they are significant, 
we reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. 
The endogeneity test (difference in Sargan) is defined as the difference  of two Sargan‐Hansen statistics:  one for the equation with the smaller set of instruments,  where the suspect regressors
are treated as endogenous, and one for the equation with the larger set of instruments, where the suspect regressors are treated as exogenous. Under the null hypothesis the specified endogenous
regressors can actually be treated as exogenous. 
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Figure 1: conditional distributions of investment growth, working capital growth and 
employment growth (credit constraints in bank financing) 
 
Figure 2: conditional distributions of investment growth, working capital growth and 
employment growth (credit constraints in other financing) 
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table A1: breakdown of observations by country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Country Freq. Percent Cum.
AT 417 5.8 5.8
BE 343 4.8 10.6
DE 810 11.3 21.9
ES 1,101 15.4 37.3
FI 357 5.0 42.3
FR 1,014 14.2 56.4
GR 397 5.5 62.0
IE 355 5.0 66.9
IT 1192 16.6 83.6
NL 547 7.6 91.2
PT 437 6.1 97.3
SK 192 2.7 100.0
Total 7,162 100.0
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Table A2: breakdown of observations by firm characteristics 
 
Freq. Percent Cum.
sector
Industry 2,312 32.3 32.3
Construction 780 10.9 43.2
Wholesale or retail trade 1,917 26.8 69.9
Other services 2,153 30.1 100.0
Total 7,162 100
size_employment
Micro 2,352 32.8 32.8
Small 2,446 34.2 67.0
Medium 2,364 33.0 100.0
Total 7,162 100
size_turnover
1 1,340 18.71 18.71
2 886 12.37 31.08
3 906 12.65 43.73
4 2,141 29.89 73.62
5 1,600 22.34 95.96
6 289 4.04 100.0
Total 7,162 100
age
>=10 years 6,094 85.1 85.1
>=5 and <10 years 775 10.8 95.9
>=2 and <5 years 242 3.4 99.3
<2 years 51 0.7 100.0
Total 7,162 100
legal form
Subsidiary or branch 807 11.3 11.3
Autonomous enterprise 6,355 88.7 100.0
Total 7,162 100
ownership structure
Public shareholders 70 1.0 1.0
Family or entrepreneurs 3,923 54.8 55.8
Other entreprises 790 11.0 66.8
Venture capital enterprises 43 0.6 67.4
Sole trader 2,168 30.3 97.7
Other 168 2.4 100.0
Total 7,162 100
exporter
0 3,314 46.3 46.3
1 3,848 53.7 100.0
Total 7,162 100
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APPENDIX B: ORDERED PROBIT 
 
For brevity of exposition, let us focus on the dependent variable investment growth ∆ܫ. The 
order probit model is specified in terms of a continuous latent variable, latent  investment 
growth ∆ܫ∗:                          
∆ܫ௜௝௖௧∗ = ௜ܺᇱߚ + ߙ௝௖௧ +	ߝ௜௝௖௧	                                                                                         (1)                                             
where i is firm, j is industry, c is country, t is wave, ௜ܺᇱ is a vector of variables that includes a set 
of credit constraints and firm-level controls, ߙ௝௖௧	are country-industry-time fixed effects and ߝ௜௝௖௧ 
is a disturbance that follows a N(0,1). 
Observed investment growth ∆ܫ, as reported to the SAFE, is then related to latent 
investment growth ∆ܫ∗ in the following way:  
∆ܫ௜௝௖௧ = "݀݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁"	(݇ = 0)  if ܫ௜௝௖௧∗ ≤ ߤଵ  
∆ܫ௜௝௖௧ = "remain unchanged"			(݇ = 1)  if ߤଵ < ܫ௜௝௖௧∗ ≤ ߤଶ 
∆ܫ௜௝௖௧ = "݅݊ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁"	(k=2 )  if ܫ௜௝௖௧∗ > ߤଷ 
where the parameters ߤଵ, ߤଶ, ߤଷ are thresholds to be jointly estimated with the slope 
parameters.  
The probability that firm i answers option k is given by:  
݌௜௞ = ܲ൫∆ܫ௜௝௖௧ = ݇൯ = ܨ൫ߤ௞ାଵ − ௜ܺᇱߚ − ߙ௝௖௧൯ − ܨ൫ߤ௞ − ௜ܺᇱߚ − ߙ௝௖௧൯                             (2)             
where F(.) is the CDF of the Normal distribution.  
The log-likelihood of the data is given by:  
log ܮ(ߚ) = ∑ ∑ ܫ௜௝log	(݌௜௞)௠௞ୀଵே௜ୀଵ                                                                                 (3)                                             
where ݌௜௞ is given by (2) and ܫ௜௞ = 1	 if ܫ௜ = ݇ and ܫ௜௞ = 0	 if ܫ௜ ≠ ݇ (i.e., if the alternative k is the 
observed outcome for observation i, then ܫ௜௞ equals 1 and the remaining ܫ௜௞ equal zero). 
Then the model is estimated by maximum likelihood.  
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APPENDIX C:  MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES CORRELATED WITH ADJUSTED 
CREDIT STANDARDS 
Table C1 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLES adjusted credit standards (SME) adjusted credit standards (SME) adjusted credit standards (large) adjusted credit standards (large)
gdp ‐0.085*** ‐0.094***
(0.013) (0.014)
consumer confidence 0.006 ‐0.001 0.013** 0.007
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008)
government bond yield ‐0.012 0.009 ‐0.073** ‐0.045
(0.044) (0.046) (0.029) (0.036)
investment growth 0.185 0.212 0.111 0.102
(0.257) (0.312) (0.300) (0.390)
unemployment rate ‐0.202 0.041
(0.339) (0.324)
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
Observations 72 72 72 72
R‐squared 0.830 0.791 0.898 0.851
Estimator: OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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